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In this paper we consider the measurement and pricing of distress risk. We present
a model of corporate failure in which accounting and market-based measures forecast
the likelihood of future ￿nancial distress. Our best model is more accurate than
leading alternative measures of corporate failure risk. We then use our measure of
￿nancial distress to examine the performance of distressed stocks from 1981 to 2008.
We ￿nd that distressed stocks have highly variable returns and high market betas and
that they tend to underperform safe stocks by more at times of high market volatility
and risk aversion. However, investors in distressed stocks have not been rewarded
for bearing these risks. Instead, distressed stocks have had very low returns, both
relative to the market and after adjusting for their high risk. The underperformance
of distressed stocks is present in all size and value quintiles. It is lower for stocks
with low analyst coverage and institutional holdings, which suggests that information
or arbitrage-related frictions may be partly responsible for the underperformance of
distressed stocks.1 Introduction
Interest in the pricing of ￿nancially distressed ￿rms is widespread. Chan and Chen
(1991) describe marginal and distressed ￿rms as follows: ￿They have lost market
value because of poor performance, they are ine¢ cient producers, and they are likely
to have high ￿nancial leverage and cash ￿ ow problems. They are marginal in the
sense that their prices tend to be more sensitive to changes in the economy, and they
are less likely to survive adverse economic conditions.￿ Asset pricing theory suggests
that investors will demand a premium for holding such stocks. It is an empirical
question whether or not investors are indeed rewarded for bearing such risk.
We investigate the pricing of ￿nancially distressed stocks in two steps: First, we
present a model predicting ￿nancial distress. Second, we consider the historical
performance of investing in distressed stock portfolios.
Our proposed measure of ￿nancial distress is the probability of failure. Following
Shumway (2001) we predict failure in a hazard model using explanatory variables
constructed from observable accounting and market-based measures. This approach
is related to an earlier literature pioneered by Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968) who
introduced Z-score as a measure of bankruptcy risk, and has recently been used by
Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie (2005).
We classify a ￿rm as more distressed if it is more likely to ￿le for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, de-list for performance related reasons, or receive a D rating
from a rating agency. This expanded measure of failure (relative to measuring only
bankruptcy ￿lings) allows us to capture at least some instances in which ￿rms fail but
reach an agreement with creditors before an actual bankruptcy ￿ling (Gilson, John,
and Lang 1990, Gilson 1997). Our data set is monthly and includes more than 2
million ￿rm-months and close to 1,750 failure events.
We predict failure over the next month (similar to Chava and Jarrow (2004)).
However, in addition we also consider the probability of failure for longer horizons.
After all, an investor will certainly care not only about imminent failure, but rather
will want to get a sense well in advance which are the ￿rms that are most likely to
fail. Although probably quite accurate, it may not be useful to predict a heart attack
with a person clutching their hand to their chest.
Firms that are distressed have the characteristics we would expect: they have re-
1cently made losses, have high leverage, their stock returns have been low and volatile,
and they have low levels of cash holdings. Our best model, which makes several
changes relative to Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004), improves forecast
accuracy by 16% when compared to these models. It also outperforms another lead-
ing alternative ￿￿ distance-to-default￿￿a measure based on the famous Merton (1974)
model of risky corporate debt and popularized by Moody￿ s KMV (see, for example,
Crosbie and Bohn(2001)). Relative to distance-to-default our model almost doubles
forecast accuracy.
We next investigate the performance of distressed stocks using our best model
to measure ￿nancial distress. Portfolios of distressed stocks have very high levels
of volatility and high market betas, which means that they are risky and should
command a high risk premium. However, their returns from 1981 to 2008 have been
low: distressed stocks have signi￿cantly underperformed the S&P500. A portfolio
going long safe stocks and shorting distressed stocks has been a highly pro￿table
strategy and has a signi￿cantly higher average return and Sharpe ratio than the
S&P500.
The underperformance of distressed stocks is puzzling given that investors seem
to realize that distressed stocks are risky: The high market betas of distressed stocks
imply that the market perceives distressed stocks as being more sensitive to overall
market conditions. Furthermore, we ￿nd that distressed stocks underperform more
severely at times of increases in market volatility, as measured by the VIX, the implied
volatility of S&P500 index options. In the last four months of 2008 a strategy of
long safe, short distressed stocks earned a return of 59%, while the return for all of
2008 was 145%.
Even if the average investor does not react, such high performance levels should
attract signi￿cant arbitrage capital and over time we should see declining pro￿ts to
this strategy. One reason why we have not observed this could be that it is di¢ cult
to obtain information about the health of distressed stocks and that they may be
di¢ cult to short sell. Due to these constraints arbitrage activity could be limited.
Consistent with this hypothesis we ￿nd that the distress e⁄ect is more concentrated
in stocks with low analyst coverage and in stocks with low levels of institutional
holdings, which has been proposed as a proxy for the ability to short such stocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief review of the
existing literature, Section 2 discusses our data and the construction of our explana-
tory variables. Section 3 presents our model of failure prediction. We investigate the
2ability of our variables to predict failure at di⁄erent horizons and compare the fore-
cast accuracy of our best model to leading alternatives. We also consider the ability
of our model to predict changes in the aggregate failure rate over time. Section 4
focuses on the performance of distressed stock portfolios. We document performance
over time and consider performance across size and value quintiles, as well as for ￿rms
with higher information and arbitrage-related frictions. Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related literature
There are several di⁄erent approaches to predicting bankruptcy. Early studies fo-
cused entirely on accounting ratios and often compared ￿nancial ratios in a group of
non-bankrupt ￿rms to a group of bankrupt ￿rms, e.g. Altman￿ s (1968) Z-score. The
subsequent literature introduced market-based variables and adopted more suitable
statistical techniques to model probability of bankruptcy. Shumway (2001) discusses
this line of research and points out the shortcomings of the early studies. Our pa-
per adds to this line of work by developing the variables used by Shumway (2001)
further and adding additional variables that lead to a large increase in the model￿ s
explanatory power.
Other studies have instead focused on using Merton (1974) as the basis for model-
ing and have chosen distance-to-default as the main variable to predict future bank-
ruptcy. Examples include Hillegeist et al. (2004), Vassalou and Xing (2004), and
Du¢ e et al. (2007). We show that using a larger set of explanatory has signi￿cantly
higher forecasting ability, a fact also pointed out by Bharath and Shumway (2008).
Another possibility is to use credit ratings as a summary measure of the risk of
future bankruptcy. Hilscher and Wilson (2009) ￿nd that using the model described
below has much higher forecast accuracy than credit ratings.
2 Constructing measures of ￿nancial distress
Our measure of ￿nancial distress is the probability of failure. We de￿ne failure to be
the ￿rst of the following events: chapter 7 or chapter 11 bankruptcy ￿ling, de-listing
due to performance related reasons, and a default or selective default rating by a
rating agency. We use monthly failure event data that runs from January 1963 to
3December 2008. Our data on failures was provided by Kamakura Risk Information
Services (KRIS) and represents an updated version of the data in Campbell, Hilscher,
and Szilagyi (2008), who use data up to December 2003.
We use accounting and market-based measures to forecast failure. Taking the
models used in Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004) as the starting point
we construct the following eight measures of ￿nancial distress, three accounting-based
measures and ￿ve market-based measures. We construct all our measures using
quarterly and annual accounting data from COMPUSTAT and daily and monthly
data from CRSP.
1. We measure pro￿tability as the ratio of net income (losses) over the previous
quarter to the market value of total assets (NIMTA). We ￿nd that the market
value of total assets, the sum of book value of total liabilities and market equity,
is a more accurate measure of assets than book value of total assets, a measure
used to scale income in previous studies. Scaling by market value of assets
gives a potentially more timely and accurate picture of the asset value of the
￿rm. Market equity capitalization is available in real time and re￿ ects recent
news to the ￿rm. Furthermore, it also allows for a more accurate valuation
of assets, e.g. growth opportunities, intangibles, departure from replacement
value, and may also re￿ ect the ￿nancing capacity of the ￿rm both in terms of
equity issuance as well as its ability to secure short-term ￿nancing.
2. Our measure of leverage is total liabilities divided by market total assets (TLMTA).
Similar to pro￿tability, we ￿nd that this measure more accurately re￿ ects dis-
tress than when scaling by book value of total assets.
3. We measure short-term liquidity using cash holdings scaled by market total
assets (CASHMTA). If a ￿rm runs out of cash and cannot secure ￿nancing
it will fail, even if its value of assets is larger than the level of its liabilities.
4. We add the ￿rm￿ s equity return (EXRET) which is the stock￿ s excess return
relative to the S&P 500 index return. We expect ￿rms close to bankruptcy and
failure to have negative returns.
5. Volatility (SIGMA) is a measure of the stock￿ s standard deviation over the
previous three months. Not surprisingly, distressed ￿rms￿stocks returns are
highly volatile.
46. Relative size (RSIZE) is the ￿rm￿ s equity capitalization relative to the S&P500
index, which we measure by taking the log of the ratio. We expect, ceteris
paribus, smaller ￿rms to have less of an ability to secure temporary ￿nancing
to prevent failure.
7. We calculate the ￿rm￿ s ratio of market equity to book equity (MB). Market-
to-book may capture over-valuation of distressed ￿rms that have recently ex-
perienced heavy losses. It may also be important in modeling default since it
might enter as an adjustment factor to our three accounting measures that are
scaled by market equity.
8. We add the log of the stock price, which we cap at $15 (PRICE). Distressed
￿rms often have very low prices, a re￿ ection of their decline in equity value.
If ￿rms are slow or reluctant to implement reverse stock splits this measure
will be related to failure. Variation above $15 does not seem to a⁄ect failure
probability and so the measure is capped at that level.
All of our measures are lagged so that they are observable at the beginning of the
month over which we measure whether or not the ￿rm fails. The three accounting
measures are based on quarterly data and we assume that it is available two months
after the end of the accounting quarter. Market data is measured at the end of the
previous month. This way we ensure that the failure prediction we propose can be
implemented in real time and that the investment returns that we discuss in Section
4 can be constructed using available data.
To control for outliers we winsorize the variables at the 5th and 95th percentile of
their distributions. This means that we replace any value below the 5th percentile
with the 5th percentile value and replace values above the 95th percentile with the
95th percentile value. The appendix of the paper describes the variable construction
in more detail.
2.1 Summary statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for these eight measures. Panel A reports sum-
mary statistics for the full sample of ￿rm-months that we use to model failure pre-
diction. Panel B reports statistics for the sample of ￿rms that fail over the following
month. The table also reports the di⁄erence in means in units of standard deviation.
5For example the overall ￿rm average of leverage is 44% while ￿rms that are about to
fail have an average leverage of 73.7%. This higher level is 1.05 standard deviations
higher than the overall mean.
When interpreting the statistics, it is important to remember a few things about
the sample and the construction of the variables. First, the summary statistics place
equal weight on all observations, which means that, when compared to value-weighted
statistics, small ￿rms dominate. This fact is re￿ ected in the summary statistics for
relative size, which we report in basis points. Relative to the market capitalization
of the S&P500 the average size of a ￿rm in our data set is equal to 1.46 basis points
(0.0146%). This fact explains the very low levels of average pro￿tability (-0.01%) and
the high levels of annualized volatility (54.2%). Second, excess return is measured in
logs, which means that we are reporting a geometric average. This fact is the reason
for very low average excess return of -1%. This low number also re￿ ects the very low
returns of small ￿rms.
Firms that are about to fail di⁄er from the overall population of ￿rms in ways that
we might expect: Distressed ￿rms have experienced losses, they have higher leverage
and their cash holdings are low. They have recently had very negative returns and
tend to be small, about one tenth of the size of the average ￿rm. They have high
volatility, an average of 100% (annualized), and at under $2 their average price per
share is less than one sixth the median price per share of the overall population. For
one half of the variables, ￿rms that are about to fail di⁄er by more than 1 standard
deviation from the population (NIMTA, TLMTA, SIGMA, and PRICE), and the
di⁄erence is large for three more variables. The only variable for which there is not a
clear di⁄erence is the market-to-book ratio. The reason is that ￿rms that are about to
fail have more extreme measures of MB, but not clearly lower or higher levels. Some
￿rms that fail have very high levels of market to book, because they are overvalued
or because recent losses have resulted in very low levels of book equity. Other failed
￿rms have low levels of market-to-book, a result of the market anticipating further
losses and the possibility of very low levels of valuation. We will see which of these
e⁄ects dominates in the next section.
These variables are all indicators of distress and using each one of them would
result in a forecast of future failure. However, combining the indicators will result in
a more accurate measure of distress and we would like to know how to best combine
the di⁄erent explanatory variables. In the next section we combine all the measures
into a single model that produces the most precise forecast of failure.
63 A model predicting ￿nancial distress
We model ￿nancial distress using a logit model, as in Shumway (2001), Chava and
Jarrow (2004), and Campbell et al. (2008). The probability of the ￿rm failing over
the next month is equal to
Pt￿1 (Yit = 1) =
1
1 + exp(￿￿ ￿ ￿xi;t￿1)
(1)
where Yit is equal to 1 if the ￿rm fails and equal to 0 if the ￿rm remains active.
￿xi;t￿1 represents a linear combination of our explanatory variables.
Before estimating the model we make two adjustments to the measures discussed
in the previous section. We construct a measure of average pro￿tability over the
previous four quarters (NIMTAAV G). We ￿nd that ￿rms that are about to fail will
likely have made losses not only over the previous quarter, but rather will have been
making losses for a more extended period of time. Since losses over the most recent
quarter will be more informative than losses four quarters ago, we place more weight
on more recent observations. Thus NIMTAAV G is a geometrically weighted average
level of pro￿tability where the weight is halved each quarter. In a similar spirit we
also construct a measure of average returns over the last 12 months (EXRETAV G)
which also places relatively more weight on more recent returns. The exact de￿nition
of these two variables is in the appendix.
Table 2 reports model estimation results when we combine these two variables with
the accounting measures (leverage and cash) and the market measures (volatility, size,
market-to-book, and price). All variables are statistically signi￿cant and have the
expected sign: ￿rms with lower pro￿tability, higher leverage, and lower cash holdings,
with lower and more volatile past returns, and with lower share prices are more likely
to fail. The one exception is the coe¢ cient on size which has a counterintuitive
positive sign, though this is most likely due to the high correlation of price and size.
We also consider two measures of model ￿t that are common in the context of
bankruptcy prediction: the model delivers an overall pseudo R2 of 31.6% and an
accuracy ratio of 95.5%. The pseudo R2 (McFadden￿ s R2) measures the performance
of the model relative to a model that only ￿ts the overall average default rate. A
completely uninformative model would have a pseudo R2 equal to 0. The accuracy
ratio is a summary measure that compares the number of correct predictions (pairs
of high predicted probabilities and subsequent failures, and pairs of low predicted
7probabilities and no subsequent failures) to the number of incorrect predictions. An
uninformative model would deliver an accuracy ratio of 50%.
Since investors will care not only about modeling ￿nancial distress over the next
month but will also be interested in the determinants of failure in the future, we
consider di⁄erent prediction horizons. We estimate the probability of failure 12
months in the future, given that the ￿rm has not failed over the next 12 months and
we do the same for 36 months. We report estimation results in the second and third
columns of Table 2.
When predicting failure in 1 year and in 3 years, all the variables remain statisti-
cally signi￿cant and come in with the expected signs, with the only exception again
being the coe¢ cients on price. At the 1-year horizon the coe¢ cient loses signi￿-
cance and at the 3-year horizon, price comes in with a positive sign. Meanwhile,
size comes in with the expected sign ￿larger ￿rms are less likely to fail. This means
that the variables have ￿ ipped signs relative to the 1 month prediction horizon. This
e⁄ect is again likely driven by their high level of correlation and the possibility of
unmodeled nonlinearities in the e⁄ects of these two variables. We also ￿nd that at
longer horizons the more persistent characteristics of the ￿rm such as volatility and
the market-to-book ratio become relatively more important.
Not surprisingly, it is much more di¢ cult to forecast ￿nancial distress farther into
the future. Both measures of accuracy drop signi￿cantly as the prediction horizon
is lengthened. At 1 year the Pseudo R2 is equal to 11.8% and at 3 years it is 4.1%,
while the accuracy ratio drops to 86.2% and 73.7% respectively. Nevertheless, even
at longer horizons, our model has a very high level of predictive ability.
We next compare our model, which we will refer to as our ￿ best model￿to leading
alternatives. Our model takes as a starting point the model proposed by Shumway
(2001) and used by Chava and Jarrow (2004), and ￿ve of our eight explanatory
variables are closely related to variables used in these models. It is, therefore, natural
to consider our model￿ s performance relative to the Shumway (2001) model. We also
compare our model￿ s performance to a common alternative, one used especially by
practitioners: distance-to-default. The model, popularized by Moody￿ s KMV, takes
the insights from option pricing used in the Merton (1974) model of risky debt and
applies them to the task of bankruptcy prediction. It assumes that a ￿rm enters
bankruptcy if in one year￿ s time the market value of assets lies below the face value
of debt. Distance-to-default has been shown to be a predictor of future default (e.g.
Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Hillegeist et al (2004)). We compare its performance
8to our model and we also ask how much the explanatory power increases if we add
distance-to-default (DD) as an additional explanatory variable to our best model.
Please see the appendix for a detailed discussion of the construction of DD.
Figure 1 reports the results. We compare our model, the Shumway model, DD
by itself, and DD in our best model. We consider seven prediction horizons, ranging
from predicting failure over the next month to predicting it in three years. At all
horizons our best model is more accurate than the Shumway model and than DD
only. The levels of outperformance vary: Our model is between 12% and 16% more
accurate than the Shumway model and between 49% and 94% more accurate than
DD only. When we add DD to our best model there is a very slight improvement in
￿t, which is natural given that we have allowed for an additional degree of freedom.
However, the incremental explanatory power is less than 5% at horizons up 18 months,
reaching 8% at 3 years. Given that DD is one single measure, it performs quite well,
and some may view it as ￿ unfair￿to compare a model with eight variables to one with
only one variable. However, when predicting ￿nancial distress there is no restriction
that says that the model can use only one variable. A richer empirical model seems
to have clear and measurable bene￿ts relative to using only one variable.
We also consider the ability of our measure to explain variation in the aggregate
failure rate over time. Changes in the bankruptcy rate over time may be related
to changes in capital structure (Bernanke and Campbell (1988)), to the riskiness of
corporate activities (Campbell et al. (2001)) and to default correlation (Das et al
(2007), Du¢ e et al. (2009)). We compare the realized failure rate and the predicted
failure rate in Figure 2. The predicted failure rate is the average probability of
failure using our best model. The failure rate is quite volatile over time and our
model captures the broad variation in the failure rate well, including the high failure
rates in the 1980s and early 1990s, the high levels of failures as a result of the bursting
of the technology bubble, the subsequent low failure rates from 2004 to 2007, and the
increase in the failure rate in 2008. The strong relationship which is apparent in the
graph is also re￿ ected in a correlation of actual and predicted failures of 84%.
4 Returns to investing in distressed stocks
We now consider the historical rates of return earned by ￿nancially distressed stocks.
We use our model of ￿nancial distress to sort stocks into portfolios and examine their
9returns from 1981 to 2008. The pronounced variation in the failure rate re￿ ected in
Figure 2 suggests that variations in the failure rate are not idiosyncratic and cannot
be diversi￿ed away. This means that investors should demand a premium for holding
them.
Every January we sort ￿rms into 10 portfolios using the 12-month ahead proba-
bility of failure from Table 3. In choosing the composition of the portfolios we pay
special attention to portfolios containing stocks with very low and very high failure
probabilities. The ￿rst portfolio contains those stocks with the lowest ￿ve percent of
the failure probability distribution (0005), the second portfolio contains the next ￿ve
percent of stocks, those with failure probabilities between the 5th and 10th percentile
of the distribution (0510). We construct the next eight portfolios similarly so that we
cover the entire spectrum of distress risk: 1020, 2040, 4060, 6080, 8090, 9095, 9599,
and 9900, which invests in the ￿rms with the top 1% of the failure probabilities. We
also consider a portfolio that goes long the safest 10% of stocks and short the most
distressed 10% (LS1090).
To avoid look-ahead bias we re-estimate the model coe¢ cients every year. For
example, we use data up to December 1990 to estimate the coe¢ cients on the eight
variables in our model, calculate failure probabilities, and then sort stocks into port-
folios in January 1991. We hold stocks for one year and calculate value-weighted
returns. To reduce turnover, we do not rebalance portfolios during the year, but
instead use weights that drift with the performance of the stocks.
Table 3 reports average returns (Panel A) and characteristics (Panel B) for the 11
portfolios. We ￿nd an almost monotonic relationship between distress and returns,
though not in the direction one might expect: safe stocks have earned high returns,
while distressed stocks have had very low returns. Average excess returns relative to
S&P500 index returns are negative starting with portfolio 4060; they are statistically
signi￿cant at the 5% level for portfolio 8090, and signi￿cant at the 1% level for the
three most distressed portfolios. The 1% most distressed stocks have underperformed
the S&P500 index by 26% (annualized monthly return). Table 3 Panel A also reports
CAPM alphas as well as alphas from the Fama and French (1993) three factor model
and the four factor model proposed by Carhart (1997). We use returns for the factors
from Ken French￿ s website to estimate these alphas. Figure 3 graphically summarizes
the pattern in returns across di⁄erent levels of distress.
Panel B reports characteristics of the portfolios￿constituent stocks. As expected,
distressed stocks are more risky than safe stocks. The three most distressed stock
10portfolios have market betas of close to 1.5. The constituent stocks are highly volatile
(between 64% and 92%) and this high volatility is also re￿ ected in the portfolio
standard deviations of between 23% and 39%. The fact that distressed stocks are
more risky means that when we correct for risk using the CAPM, the mispricing of
distressed stocks will become more pronounced. Indeed we ￿nd that CAPM alphas
and Fama French 3-factor alphas follow the same pattern as mean excess returns:
distressed stocks signi￿cantly underperform safe stocks. For CAPM alphas there
is statistically signi￿cant underperformance starting with portfolios 8090 while for
3-factor alphas there is signi￿cant underperformance even for the 4060 portfolio, as
well as signi￿cant outperformance for the two portfolios containing the safest stocks.
One of the variables in the failure prediction model is the weighted average of recent
past returns which means that distressed stocks may have negative momentum. We
indeed ￿nd that when we correct for the momentum factor the underperformance of
distressed stocks is less pronounced, though still large and signi￿cant.
Distressed stocks are much smaller than safe stocks: the average stock in the safest
80% of the distress risk distribution has a size of between 7 and 9 basis points of the
overall S&P500 market capitalization, while the 1% most distressed stocks have a size
of 0.36 basis points, close to 1/20th of that.2 The market-to-book ratio follows a U-
shaped pattern. Both safe and distressed ￿rms have higher levels of market-to-book
than ￿rms towards the middle of the distribution. This pattern may re￿ ect the fact
that young ￿rms with low levels of leverage are safe growth stocks. At the same time,
distressed ￿rms may be overvalued or have low levels of book equity due to recent
losses and high levels of market-to-book. We also report annualized 12-month failure
probabilities, which are much higher for distressed stocks.
Our ￿ndings are related to previous studies that have used Ohlson￿ s (1980) O-Score
and Altman￿ s (1968) Z-Score to explore pricing of ￿nancially distressed ￿rms. Exam-
ples include Dichev (1998), Gri¢ n and Lemmon (2002) and Ferguson and Shockley
(2003). Avramov et al. (2007) and Avramov et al. (2009) consider equity returns
using credit ratings. We use an updated and improved measure of distress risk that
we ￿nd to be signi￿cantly more accurate than previous measures. By using this mea-
sure we are able to show a more accurate picture of the characteristics and relative
underperformance of distressed stocks.
2Since the portfolios are value-weighted, the characteristics reported in Panel B are also value
weighted. This explains the di⁄erence in average size when compared to the equally-weighted
statistics reported in Table 1.
114.1 Performance of distressed stocks across characteristics
and over time
The pronounced pattern of size and value across the distress-risk sorted portfolios
suggests that the underperformance of distressed stocks may be related to their char-
acteristics. We therefore now consider the performance of distressed stocks across
portfolios sorted on size and value. For both characteristics we sort ￿rst on size and
value, then on distress. We use the NYSE breakpoints from Ken French￿ s website
to do the sorting. We then calculate 3-factor alphas on portfolios long the safest
quintile, short the most distressed quintile.
Figure 4 reports the results. We ￿nd a clear pattern across size-sorted portfolios
with annualized alphas of 16.3% for small ￿rms, compared to 10.2% for large ￿rms.
Though the outperformance is larger for small ￿rms, this may be driven by a larger
spread in distress risk between safe and risky small stocks. This is likely given
that distressed ￿rms are much smaller. We correct for the higher spread in distress
for smaller stocks by calculating 3-factor alphas scaled by the di⁄erence in failure
probability (￿^ P-adjusted 3-factor alpha￿ ) and ￿nd that the di⁄erence in performance
is driven entirely by the higher spread in distress risk for small ￿rms.
We also compare the relative performance of safe and distressed stocks across
portfolios sorted on value. The underperformance of distressed stocks is more pro-
nounced for extreme growth and value stocks. The 3-factor alphas for the highest
and the lowest quintile of the book-to-market distribution are almost twice as large
as the alphas for the three middle groups. We again adjust for the dispersion in
failure probability and ￿nd that the large performance gap for the extreme portfolios
is partly driven by the larger spread in the failure probability ^ P. The 3-factor alpha
and the ^ P-adjusted 3-factor alpha are all statistically signi￿cant (18 of 20 coe¢ cients
at the 1% level, and 2 coe¢ cients at the 5% level). We conclude that the under-
performance of ￿nancially distressed stocks is present across the entire spectrum of
the size and value distributions and is not concentrated only in a particular group of
￿rms.
One possibility for the underperformance of distressed stocks might be that in-
vestors are unaware of some companies￿level of ￿nancial distress or that it is di¢ cult
for investors to easily borrow stocks of distressed ￿rms that they can short sell. In
other words, it is possible that the underperformance of distressed stocks is concen-
trated in ￿rms that have informational or arbitrage related frictions.
12We consider this hypothesis by comparing performance across stocks with di⁄er-
ent levels of analyst coverage. If ￿rms have high analyst coverage it is likely that
information is more easily available and that news about ￿rms￿prospects reaches
market participants more quickly. Since there is a strong relationship between size
and analyst coverage ￿large stocks tend to have higher analyst coverage than small
stocks ￿we correct for the e⁄ect of size on analyst coverage by calculating residual
analyst coverage (following Hong, Lim, and Stein (2001)). This way we include both
large and small stocks that have lower analyst coverage than other stocks of com-
parable size. We then sort ￿rst on the top and bottom third of the distribution of
residual analyst coverage, then on distress.
Table 4 reports the results. We ￿nd that the relative underperformance of dis-
tressed stocks, measured by their 3-factor alphas, is about twice as large for ￿rms
with low analyst coverage. The di⁄erence in ^ P-adjusted 3-factor alphas is smaller
which means that the e⁄ect is partly driven by a higher dispersion in distress for
lower analyst coverage stocks.
We also consider whether or not there is a relationship between the level of in-
stitutional holdings and the performance of distressed stocks. Higher institutional
holding may be viewed as a proxy for the relative availability of stocks that can be
borrowed for short-selling purposes and that can be arbitraged by institutional in-
vestors (see, for example, Nagel (2005)). Similar to analyst coverage, institutional
holdings also have a strong pattern across size so we calculate residual institutional
holdings before sorting stocks into the top and bottom third of the distribution. We
￿nd that the underperformance of distressed stocks is again about twice as large for
low institutional holding stocks. The relative magnitude is similar for ^ P-adjusted
3-factor alphas.
It is also possible that the underperformance of distressed stocks is very concen-
trated. It may also have been reduced over time as investors have become more
aware of the pattern. We consider this hypothesis and next examine the relative
performance of distressed stocks over time. Figure 5 reports the cumulative perfor-
mance of the portfolio long the safest 10% of stocks and short the most distressed 10%
(LS1090 in Table 3), from 1981 to 2008. The ￿gure plots cumulative excess returns,
CAPM alphas and 3-factor alphas. For comparison we also report the cumulative
excess return of the S&P500 relative to the risk-free rate. (We use monthly risk free
returns from Ken French￿ s data library.)
The graph illustrates the performance of the long-short portfolio relative to the
13market portfolio. Over the entire period the long-short portfolio has outperformed
the market, which re￿ ects the signi￿cant excess return we report in Table 3. Once we
adjust for risk the outperformance of the long safe, short distressed strategy widens,
again consistent with the results reported in Table 3. A long-short strategy with
initial size of $1 and invested in from January 1981 to December 2008 resulted in
$3.41 (market return relative to the risk-free rate), $18.33 (long safe-short distressed),
$38.60 (CAPM alpha) and $220.92 (3-factor alpha). The Sharpe ratios of the four
strategies over the period are equal to 37% (market), 55% (long safe-short distressed),
67% (CAPM alpha) and 97% (3-factor alpha).
Figure 5 also illustrates that there are risks associated with the long-short strategy
and that returns have not been uniformly high. Excess returns and CAPM alphas
are somewhat concentrated in the period from 1984 to 1991 as well as from 2003
to 2008. Also, cumulative returns of the long-short strategy over the period from
2000 to the second quarter of 2008 have been close to zero (though, not surprisingly,
they were very high from September to December 2008). The performance for risk-
adjusted returns (CAPM alpha and 3-factor alpha) is much more consistent over
time. In addition, especially since 2000, the long safe-short distressed portfolio has
tended to have high returns during times of low market returns. Table 3 reports
that the CAPM beta of the long-short portfolio is equal to -0.47 and this negative
beta is re￿ ected in the graph: The market downturns of 2001/2002 and 2008 are both
associated with strong performance of the long-short portfolio, while the market rally
of 2003 is associated with low returns of the long-short strategy.
It is possible that investors do not perceive distressed stocks as risky and therefore
do not demand compensation for taking on risk. However, if instead distressed
stocks are viewed by investors as risky and if they are viewed as marginal, then we
might expect distressed stocks to do particularly poorly at times of heightened market
uncertainty and at times during which investors are reluctant to hold risky assets.
As a proxy for such times we use the VIX index, the implied volatility of the S&P500.
During times of high market volatility, we might expect a ￿ ￿ ight to quality e⁄ect,￿
which leads investors to bid up the prices of safe stocks relative to those that are
distressed. We would also expect such a pattern given the evidence of a positive
correlation between credit spreads and the VIX index (see, for example, Berndt et al.
(2005), and Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008)).
Figure 6 plots the cumulative return on the long safe-short distressed portfolio (the
same as in Figure 5) and the VIX index from 1990 to 2008 (the time during with the
14VIX is available). The graph illustrates the pattern that we might expect: distressed
stocks do relatively more poorly during times of heightened market volatility and
risk aversion. The graph also re￿ ects the correlation of long safe-short distressed and
contemporaneous changes in the VIX of 24% (monthly frequency) and 42% (quarterly
frequency).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we consider the measurement and pricing of stocks in ￿nancial dis-
tress. We ￿rst present a model of ￿nancial distress that predicts corporate failure
using accounting and market-based variables. The model￿ s predictions are intuitive:
distressed ￿rms are those that have recently made losses, have high leverage, low
and volatile recent returns, have levels of market-to-book and low share prices. Our
best model outperforms leading alternatives such as the model proposed by Shumway
(2001) as well as distance-to-default, an approach popular in industry and one use by
Vassalou and Xing (2004) as well as Hillegeist et al. (2004).
In the second part of the paper we consider the performance of distressed stocks
from 1981 to 2008. We ￿nd that distressed stocks have signi￿cantly underperformed
the S&P500 and that they are risky ￿they have high levels of volatility and high
market betas. This means that once we adjust for risk using the CAPM and Fama
French 3-factor model, the apparent mispricing of distressed stocks worsens.
The strong underperformance of distressed stocks is a puzzle. We examine it
further by considering three hypotheses: is the underperformance concentrated in
￿rms with particular characteristics, is it more pronounced for ￿rms with lower levels
of available information, or is it concentrated at particular points in time?
We ￿nd that the underperformance of distressed relative to safe stocks is present
across all size and value quintiles, though it is more pronounced for portfolios that
have a larger spread in failure probability, a fact that explains the more extreme
underperformance of distressed stocks for small ￿rms. Furthermore, we ￿nd that
the low performance of distressed stocks is concentrated in stocks with lower analyst
coverage and lower institutional holdings. We interpret this fact as suggesting that
for some distressed ￿rms it may be di¢ cult to easily gain information about their
￿nancial health and it may not be possible to short-sell severely distressed stocks.
15The potential barriers to arbitrage may be one reason why there have continued to
be times of strong underperformance throughout our sample period.
What does all of this mean in practice? Our results suggest that investors should
stay away from investing in distressed stocks. Furthermore, it should be quite possible
for investors to collect information about ￿rms￿health using the measures in our
model. Investing more heavily in safe stocks will reduce a diversi￿ed portfolio￿ s
volatility and its beta while increasing its returns. When possible, investors should
also short sell ￿rms in distress.
It seems unlikely that investors are not informed well enough to realize the op-
portunities that they seem to be missing. We present a measure that is straight
forward to construct and that investors could easily get access to. A more plausible
explanation is that for some stocks short selling is constrained. This constraint may
cause prices of distressed stocks to stay too high for too long. However, we ￿nd that
the underperformance of distressed stocks is still present for large ￿rms, for ￿rms with
higher than average analyst coverage and with high levels of institutional holdings.
For those stocks we might expect pro￿ts to decline in the future.
In many areas of quantitative equity investing, pro￿ts have declined over time due
to increased entry into the market and the resulting increase in competition (Khan-
dani and Lo (2007)). The return to a strategy investing in safe stocks and shorting
distressed stocks does not seem to be an obvious exception to this pattern. There
are clear risks associated with a long-short strategy, pro￿ts have not been uniformly
high, and over the last decade a simple long short strategy has only marginally out-
performed the market. However, a strategy long safe, short distressed stocks has
a very appealing quality in that returns seem to be concentrated in down markets.
Furthermore, once adjusting for risk, the returns have been more stable and there has
been less evidence of a decline in pro￿ts.
16Appendix
In this appendix we discuss issues related to the construction of our data set and
restrictions for the inclusion in our estimation sample. All variables are constructed
using COMPUSTAT and CRSP data.
The accounting ratios, relative size, excess return, and market-to-book are de￿ned
as follows:
NIMTAit =
Net Incomeit
(MEit + Total Liabilitiesit)
TLMTAit =
Total Liabilitiesit
(MEit + Total Liabilitiesit)
CASHMTAit =
Cash and Short Term Investmentsit
(MEit + Total Liabilitiesit)
RSIZEit = log
￿
MEit
Total S&P500 Market V aluet
￿
EXRETit = log(1 + Rit) ￿ log(1 + RS&P500;t)
MBit =
MEit
BEadjusted;i;t
where ME is the market value of equity and book equity (BE) is constructed as in
Davis, Fama and French (2000) and outlined in detail in Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho
(2003). We adjust BE by the di⁄erence between market equity (ME) and BE:
BEadjusted;i;t = BEit + 0:1(MEit ￿ BEit):
This transformation helps with the values of BE that are very small, probably mis-
measured and lead to very large values of MB. To adjust for negative levels of BE
we replace those observations with $1 before calculating the market-to-book ratio.
We use the following COMPUSTAT quarterly data items for the construction of the
accounting measures: LTQ and MIBQ for total liabilities. Note that as a result of
recent COMPUSTAT reporting changes LTQ no longer includes minority interest.
To account for this change we measure Total Liabilitiesit as LTQ plus MIBQ. We
use NIQ for net income, and CHEQ for cash and short-term investments. Each of
the seven explanatory variables is winsorized using a 5/95 percentile interval in order
to eliminate outliers.
Our measure of equity return volatility is the annualized 3-month return standard
17deviation centered around zero:
SIGMAi;t￿1;t￿3 =
0
@252 ￿
1
N ￿ 1
X
k2ft￿1;t￿2;t￿3g
r
2
i;k
1
A
1
2
We eliminate cases where too few observations are available to construct a valid
measure of volatility and set SIGMA to missing if there are fewer than ￿ve non-zero
return observations over the three months window. We also construct
NIMTAAV Gt￿1;t￿12 =
1 ￿ ￿
3
1 ￿ ￿
12
￿
NIMTAt￿1;t￿3 + ::: + ￿
9NIMTAt￿10;t￿12
￿
EXRETAV Gt￿1;t￿12 =
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
12
￿
EXRETt￿1 + ::: + ￿
11EXRETt￿12
￿
where the coe¢ cient ￿ = 2￿ 1
3, which implies that the weight is halved each quarter.
For a ￿rm-month observation to be included in the estimation sample (Table 2)
we must observe leverage, pro￿tability, excess return, and market capitalization. We
do not require a valid measure of SIGMA and replace it with its cross-sectional
mean when this variable is missing. We use a similar procedure for missing lags of
NIMTA and EXRET in constructing the weighted average measures NIMTAAV G
and EXRETAV G. We also replace missing values of cash and market-to-book with
the respective cross-sectional means. We do not restrict our sample of ￿rms to include
only those with share codes 10 and 11, as Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) do, though
our results are robust to such a restriction.
In order to calculate distance-to-default we construct measures of asset value and
asset volatility by solving two equations simultaneously: First, in the Merton model
equity is valued as a European call option on the value of the ￿rm￿ s assets:
ME = TADDN (d1) ￿ BDexp(￿RBILLT)N (d2)
d1 =
log
￿TADD
BD
￿
+
￿
RBILL + 1
2SIGMA2
DD
￿
T
SIGMADD
p
T
d2 = d1 ￿ SIGMADD
p
T;
where TADD and SIGMADD denote asset value and volatility, BD is the face value
of debt maturing at time T, and RBILL is the Treasury bill rate. Following the
convention for the distance-to-default calculation (Crosbie and Bohn (2001), Vassalou
18and Xing (2004)), we assume T = 1, and use short term plus one half long term book
debt to proxy for BD.
The second equation is a relation between equity volatility and asset volatility:
SIGMA = N (d1)
TADD
ME
SIGMADD:
We solve the two equations numerically to ￿nd values for TADD and SIGMADD
that are consistent with the inputs. Before calculating asset value and volatility, we
adjust BD so that BD=(ME + BD) is winsorized at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles of
the cross-sectional distribution and winsorize SIGMA at the same percentline levels.
We do this to reduce cases for which the numerical algorithm does not converge. We
then compute distance to default as
DD =
￿log(BD=TADD) + 0:06 + RBILL ￿ 1
2SIGMA2
DD
SIGMADD
:
The number 0.06 appears in the formula as an empirical proxy for the equity premium.
We view using this measure as less noisy than using e.g. the average stock return
over the previous year, an approach employed in previous studies.
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22Variable NIMTA TLMTA CASHMTA EXRET RSIZE SIGMA MB PRICE
Mean -0.01% 44.0% 8.7% -1.0% 1.46 54.2% 2.08 10.13
Median 0.5% 41.6% 4.7% -0.8% 0.26 45.4% 1.62 12.63
St. Dev. 2.3% 28.2% 10.0% 11.4% 2.81 32.0% 1.58 5.34
Observations: 2,022,562
Mean -4.3% 73.7% 7.3% -10.7% 0.15 113.7% 2.10 1.93
St. Dev. Difference 1.88 1.05 0.14 0.85 0.47 1.86 0.01 1.53
Observations: 1,756
Panel A: Entire data set
Panel B: Failure group
Table 1: Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the following variables (for more details see the data description and the appendix): net income over market
value of total assets (NIMTA), total liabilities over market value of total assets (TLMTA), excess return relative to value-weighted S&P 500 return,
annualized (EXRET), firm’s market equity over the total valuation of S&P 500, reported in basis points (RSIZE), stock return standard deviation
computed as square root of a sum of squared firm stock returns over three-month period, annualized (SIGMA), stock of cash and short-term
investments over the market value of total assets (CASHMTA), market-to-book value of the firm (MB) and price per share winsorized above at $15
(PRICE). Market value of total assets is calculated by adding the market value of firm equity to its total liabilities. Panel A reports summary statistics
for all firm-month observations, Panel B reports summary statistics for the failure group. Summary statistics are reported for those observations for
which values of all variables are available. Panel B reports the difference between the full sample mean and the failure group mean in units of full
sample standard deviation.Lag (months) 01 2 3 6
NIMTAAVG -29.00 -20.12 -11.93
(16.65)** (14.11)** (5.13)**
TLMTA 3.51 1.60 0.73
(12.77)** (8.34)** (3.84)**
CASHMTA -2.49 -2.27 -1.85
(7.07)** (7.39)** (5.02)**
EXRETAVG -8.02 -7.88 -3.50
(12.40)** (9.16)** (3.19)**
SIGMA 1.69 1.55 1.43
(9.31)** (5.44)** (8.58)**
RSIZE 0.138 -0.005 -0.133
(2.84)** (0.15) (3.44)**
MB 0.05 0.07 0.115
(3.23)** (5.57)** (6.41)**
PRICE -0.974 -0.09 0.219
(10.26)** (0.84) (3.21)**
Constant -8.63 -8.87 -10.03
(14.17)** (17.44)** (20.93)**
Observations 2,022,562 1,870,481 1,477,749
Failures 1,756 2,159 1,655
Pseudo-R
2 0.316 0.118 0.041
Accuracy ratio 0.955 0.862 0.737
Table 2: Failure prediction at different horizons
This table reports results from logit regressions of the failure indicator on our set of
explanatory variables. The data are constructed such that all of the predictor
variables are observable at the beginning of the month over which failure is
measured ('0'), as well as when using data lagged 12 and 36 months to predict
failure. Failure events are measured from 1963 to 2008. Z-statistics (reported in
parentheses) are calculated using standard errors that are robust and clustered by
year. ** denotes significant at 1%.Table 3: Returns on failure probability-sorted stock portfolios
We sort all stocks based on the predicted 12-month probability of failure and divide them into 10 portfolios based on percentile cutoffs, for example, 0 to 5th
percentile (0005) and from the 99th to 100th percentile (9900) of the P_hat distribution, as well as a portfolio long the 10% lowest P_hat stocks and short
the 10% highest P_hat stocks. We report measures of returns for value-weighted excess returns over the market. We report mean excess returns, CAPM
alphas, Fama-French 3-factor alphas and Carhart 4-factor alphas, all annualized, as well as absolute values of t-statistics (in parentheses); * denotes
significant at 5%, ** denotes significant at 1%. The sample period is 1981 to 2008. Panel B reports portfolio characteristics: CAPM betas, annualized
Portfolios 0005 0510 1020 2040 4060 6080 8090 9095 9599 9900 LS1090
Panel A: Portfolio alphas
significant at 5%, denotes significant at 1%. The sample period is 1981 to 2008. Panel B reports portfolio characteristics: CAPM betas, annualized
standard deviation and skewness of individual and portfolio returns, mean market equity over the total valuation of the S&P 500, reported in basis points
(RSIZE), market-to-book (MB), and probability of failure (Phat) values for each portfolio, annualized.
Mean excess return 3.7% 1.0% 0.2% 0.9% -0.5% -1.5% -6.5% -12.6% -9.4% -25.7% 14.3%
(1.55) (0.45) (0.18) (1.31) (0.37) (0.74) (2.05)* (2.91)** (1.88) (3.51)** (2.92)**
CAPM alpha 3.1% 0.7% 0.1% 1.2% -0.7% -2.5% -8.3% -15.4% -12.1% -28.2% 16.7%
(1.32) (0.30) (0.08) (1.74) (0.57) (1.27) (2.74)** (3.79)** (2.52)* (3.92)** (3.53)**
3-factor alpha 52 % 42 % 14 % 09 % -25 % -56 % -12 2% -17 4% -16 4% -31 2% 22 5%
Panel A: Portfolio alphas
3-factor alpha 5.2% 4.2% 1.4% 0.9% -2.5% -5.6% -12.2% -17.4% -16.4% -31.2% 22.5%
(2.53)* (2.07)* (1.22) (1.26) (2.10)* (3.01)** (4.23)** (4.72)** (3.90)** (4.81)** (4.94)**
4-factor alpha 1.0% 0.6% -0.6% 1.1% 0.1% -0.6% -4.7% -7.9% -7.5% -24.2% 9.2%
(0.55) (0.31) (0.51) (1.57) (0.05) (0.38) (2.00)* (2.60)** (2.00)* (3.75)** (2.68)**
Panel B: Portfolio characteristics
CAPM beta 1.07 1.03 0.99 0.91 1.01 1.16 1.31 1.51 1.49 1.46 -0.47
Portfolio SD 12.5% 12.1% 6.5% 3.7% 6.6% 10.7% 16.8% 22.9% 26.6% 38.7% 25.9%
Portfolio skewness 1.20 0.62 0.03 0.07 -0.18 -0.14 0.72 1.27 1.62 1.63
Individual SD 34.4% 33.8% 29.6% 27.9% 29.1% 34.7% 48.1% 64.4% 76.4% 92.0%
Individual skewness 06 5 07 4 05 7 08 7 08 5 07 8 13 8 29 4 16 8 25 0
Panel B: Portfolio characteristics
Individual skewness 0.65 0.74 0.57 0.87 0.85 0.78 1.38 2.94 1.68 2.50
Mean RSIZE 7.35 8.23 9.00 9.19 8.50 7.21 4.70 2.19 1.16 0.36
Mean MB 2.70 3.18 3.02 2.62 2.20 1.98 2.27 2.69 3.14 3.79
Mean Failure Prob. 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 1.3% 2.2% 3.9% 9.0%high low high low
3-factor alpha 11.6% 20.7% 11.9% 22.6%
(3.03)** (5.94)** (3.55)** (5.36)**
6.4% 9.5% 5.7% 10.8%
(3.42)** (6.05)** (3.66)** (5.49)**
Table 4: Information and arbitrage related frictions
We report three-factor alphas and P_hat-adjusted alphas for portfolios long safe, short
distressed stocks. We sort first on size-adjusted analyst coverage (from I/B/E/S) and size-
adjusted institutional holdings (constructed from spectrum data), then on distress. We
report returns for stocks in the top third (high) and bottom third (low) of each
characteristic's distribution. ** denotes significant at the 1% level.
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Figure 1: Prediction accuracy for different models: The figure plots the pseudo 
R-squared for four different models when predicting failures over different horizons. 
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Figure 2: Actual and predicted failures over time: The figure plots the actual 
frequency of failures and the model-predicted frequency (using our best model). 
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Figure 3: Returns of distress risk-sorted portfolios: The figure plots the annual-
ized mean excess return relative to the market, portfolio CAPM alpha, and Fama-
French 3-factor alpha for the 10 distress risk sorted portfolios from 1981 to 2008.  
Portfolios are formed at the beginning of January every year using the model 
predicted probability of failure. 
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Figure 4: Distress effect across size and value quintiles: The figure plots 
portfolio alphas for long safe, short distressed stocks across size and value quintiles. 
P_hat-adjusted returns are average excess returns adjusted for the difference in 
probability of failure between the high and the low distress components of the long-
short portfolios. 
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Figure 5: Cumulative returns for different strategies: The figure plots the 
cumulative returns for the following excess returns series: (1) long safe-short 
distressed (portfolio LS1090 in Table 3), and that portfolio’s (2) CAPM alpha, and (3) 
3-factor alpha, as well as a portfolio (4) long the market, short the risk-free asset. 
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Figure 6: Distressed stock returns and VIX: The figure plots excess returns for 
portfolios long safe, short distressed stocks (LS1090 in Table 3) and the VIX index. 